Will Zcash's Orchard pool be confirmed as exploited by January 1, 2027? [ resolves 2027-01-01 (150D) ]
Zcash's Orchard pool confirmed exploited?
polymarket: [C] multiple sources, no tie-break·reporting consensus methodology ›
markets · by resolution date · marks: daily snapshot
polymarket 1 market
| market | resolves | P(YES) | vol (24h) | vol (cum) | RCG | venue id | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zcash's Orchard pool confirmed exploited | 2027-01-01 | 3.7% | — | $25K | C | 0x270d3e…4176 |
resolution architecture
| venue | proposer | source | citation | arbitration | class | analyst notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| polymarket | Whitelisted Proposers | uncommitted | not provided | Optimistic Oracle (UMA) | Other | — |
verbatim rules
polymarket
This market asks whether Zcash's Orchard pool vulnerability publicized June 4 is confirmed to have been exploited on Zcash mainnet before it was fixed.
This market resolves "Yes" if Shielded Labs, the Zcash Foundation, or the Zcash Open Development Lab (ZODL) explicitly confirms, or an overwhelming consensus of credible reporting confirms, that the June 4 Zcash Orchard pool vulnerability was exploited on mainnet before the fix was activated by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Explicit confirmation of any of the following will qualify:
- The Orchard pool bug was exploited on Zcash mainnet
- Any extra, unauthorized, invalid, or unbacked Zcash was created in the Orchard pool through this vulnerability
- A Zcash network upgrade, migration, audit, turnstile-accounting process (including the proposed new shielded pool with enforced turnstile accounting on exiting Orchard coins), or official investigation reveals excess or invalid Zcash in the Orchard pool that the source attributes to this specific vulnerability.
New or different exploits targeting the Orchard pool after the original vulnerability was fixed are explicitly disqualified and will not qualify.
This market will resolve based on official information from Shielded Labs, the Zcash Foundation, or the Zcash Open Development Lab (ZODL), however, an overwhelming consensus of credible reporting confirming a qualifying exploit may also resolve this market.
platform source field
polymarket.resolutionSource → ∅ no committed source — see rules text above sources (3)
Shielded Labs from rules text the Zcash Foundation from rules text the Zcash Open Development Lab (ZODL) from rules text
recent wire items
- Zcash Orchard pool exploit confirmation stays a long shot at 6 percent Polymarket 6%
- Polymarket puts only 6% odds on Zcash's Orchard pool being confirmed as exploited by January 1, 2027, treating the pool itself as likely intact.
- Reports describe stolen funds being routed through Zcash's privacy pool, not a breach of the pool's cryptographic infrastructure -- a distinction the market appears to be pricing.
- The news draws attention to privacy-coin exploit concealment mechanics without shifting the contract's probability, suggesting the market reads routing-through as distinct from a protocol exploit.
- Resolution via UMA oracle requires confirmation that the Orchard pool itself was exploited, not merely used as a laundering channel -- a high bar given current reporting.
programmatic access · four surfaces, same payload
One canonical record at every surface — embedded JSON-LD, REST, MCP, and /llms.txt.
| HTML | browsers, AI grounded search, crawlers (embedded JSON-LD @type: Dataset) | https://clearmarket.fyi/events/zcashs-orchard-pool-confirmed-exploited-20260605210804589/ |
| JSON | REST API for developers | https://api.clearmarket.fyi/v1/events/zcashs-orchard-pool-confirmed-exploited-20260605210804589 |
| MCP | agentic AI tool call (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Continue) | clearmarket.get_event("zcashs-orchard-pool-confirmed-exploited-20260605210804589") |
| AGENT | AI crawler discovery index | /llms.txt |
Snapshot 2026-08-04. Venue data via Kalshi + Polymarket APIs. Editorial fields (tags, editorial_notes) are ClearMarket-drafted with AI assistance under editorial review. Derived fields (venues_covered, resolution_clarity_grade, rcg_score) computed at serve time. Full per-field map in the JSON record under field_provenance.
raw JSON record · same payload returned by REST endpoint {
"event_id": "CM-EVT-96QBN5QTG3",
"slug": "zcashs-orchard-pool-confirmed-exploited-20260605210804589",
"question": "Will Zcash's Orchard pool be confirmed as exploited by January 1, 2027?",
"category": "crypto",
"tags": [
"crypto",
"zcash",
"security-exploit",
"privacy-protocols",
"2027"
],
"venues_covered": [
"polymarket"
],
"market_count": 1,
"cumulative_volume_usd": 25441,
"resolution_clarity_grade": "C",
"rcg_score": 40,
"rcg_caps": [
"multi_source_no_conflict_rule",
"commitment_uncommitted_placeholder"
],
"resolution_source": null,
"resolution_source_url": null,
"source_status": "no_committed_source",
"source_of_record": null,
"resolution_source_list": [
{
"name": "Shielded Labs",
"url": null,
"provenance": "clearmarket_editorial"
},
{
"name": "the Zcash Foundation",
"url": null,
"provenance": "clearmarket_editorial"
},
{
"name": "the Zcash Open Development Lab (ZODL)",
"url": null,
"provenance": "clearmarket_editorial"
}
],
"arbitration_model": "uma_oracle",
"proposer_model": "managed_whitelist",
"field_provenance": {
"question": {
"source": "clearmarket_editorial"
},
"tags": {
"source": "clearmarket_editorial",
"ai_drafted": true
},
"resolution_clarity_grade": {
"source": "derived",
"method": "rcg_v2_7factor"
},
"venues_covered": {
"source": "derived"
}
}
}